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Abstract
US-educated Indian engineers played a major role in the establish-
ment of the “Silicon Valley of Asia” in Bangalore. The experience
of India and other countries shows that returning well-educated emi-
grants, despite their small numbers, can make a difference. This paper
builds a model of “local” knowledge spillovers, in which migration of a
small number of highly skilled individuals greatly affects country-level
human capital accumulation. All economic activity occurs in pairs of
individuals randomly matched to each other. Each pair produces the
consumption good; the skills of the two partners are complementary.
At the same time, the less skilled partner increases human capital by
learning from the more skilled colleague. With poor institutions at
home, highly skilled individuals leave the country seeking better op-
portunities abroad. On the contrary, improved institutions foster re-
turn migration of emigrants who have acquired more knowledge while
abroad. These return migrants greatly amplify the positive effect of
better institutions.
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1 Motivation
High-skilled emigrants returning home can make a difference. Saxenian
(2006) describes how the rapid growth of the information technology in-
dustry in Israel, India, Taiwan, and later mainland China was tightly related
to return migration of Israeli, Indian, and Chinese high-skilled engineers liv-
ing in the US, mainly in the Silicon Valley. These engineers used their US
experience to start new businesses at home, train local employees, and enter
the global market with their new products.
Recent economic models of growth and development can do little to ex-
plain such rapid productivity growth on such a large scale. There exist models
of brain drain (for example, Haque and Kim 1995) and return migration (such
as Dos Santos and Postel-Vinay 2003) which are based on the assumption
that average human capital of the previous generation has a positive effect on
human capital acquisition by the new generation. Emigration of the highly-
skilled reduces average human capital in the country, thus reducing human
capital of future generations. Likewise, return of the highly-skilled increases
average human capital, which has a positive externality on the young people.
Empirically, however, the number of returning high-skilled emigrants is
usually too small to have any significant effect on average human capital.
Few hundreds of Indian talented engineers cannot change the average human
capital of the Indian labor force with its half-billion people; they can only
change the 99th percentile of the human capital distribution. There has to be
another mechanism, in which people at the top of human capital distribution
play a much greater role than those at the bottom.
Another problem is to explain the incentives of return migrants. It is
relatively easy to create a model of one-way migration, but it proved more
difficult to explain why a person who migrated from one country to another
decides to reverse his decision after a while. The existing literature tends
to explain return by “homesickness”: although they are more productive
abroad, some emigrants choose to return home after accumulating enough
knowledge or wealth.1
One more problem is to explain why emigrants do return to some home
countries, and don’t return to others. Borjas and Bratsberg (1996) in their
empirical cross-country study conclude that the probability of a US immi-
1Alternatively, some papers assume that individual productivity is exogenously lower
if he works abroad, which creates return incentives
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grant returning home positively depends on GDP per capita at home, which
is easy to explain: wealthier countries typically have lower crime and pro-
vide better public goods, and therefore more attractive for living. Yet, the
above mentioned countries (India, Taiwan, mainland China, Israel) did not
have high income levels and good infrastructure from the start, but still ex-
perienced significant high-skilled return migration. An explanation of this
fact may come from another finding of Borjas and Bratsberg (1996): they
show that the “communist country” dummy is highly negatively significant,2
which suggests that home country institutions may be an important factor
affecting migration decisions.
In this paper, I propose a model of “local” knowledge spillovers. Instead
of assuming that a high-skilled individual has a small positive externality on
all young individuals by increasing average human capital, I assume that such
an individual has a large positive externality on someone, and no immediate
effect on the rest of population. For example, Amartya Sen returning to India
would have a far greater influence on his immediate colleagues and students
than on illiterate people living in remote villages.
After a while, those who learn from high-skilled returnees become high-
skilled themselves, which enables them to train more unskilled individuals.
Thus, the number of individuals with high human capital increases exponen-
tially. With this “bootstrap” training technology, a small number of new
high-skilled individuals may lead to a major shift of the human capital dis-
tribution over time.
Both production and learning occur in partnerships which consist of two
individuals, randomly matched to each other. The amount of output they
produce is a complementary function of their human capitals; they divide
their joint output according to a bargaining rule. At the same time, the less
skilled individual (the “apprentice”) learns from the more skilled partner (the
“master”).3 Due to skill complementarities of the two partners in production,
the opportunity cost of such education is wasted talent of the master, in terms
of current production. Obviously, in order to learn, the apprentice should
compensate this wasted talent by accepting a lower, or even negative, share
2Their data was collected in the 1970’s, at the peak of the cold war
3The terms “master” and “apprentice” are used here because learning occurs simulta-
neously with production. However, the “apprenticeship” here is somewhat different from
its original meaning – medieval apprentices were bonded to their masters until they pay
off their debt, while in my model they typically consume out of their own savings and have
no financial obligations
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of their joint output. The two partners may choose to split anytime; then,
they are randomly matched to new partners after a waiting period.
The time needed to find a new partner may exogenously differ across
countries, and it serves as a proxy for institutional quality in the model. In
countries with high corruption and bureaucracy, starting a new business typ-
ically requires much more time and money; it is widely believed that these
entry costs have a significant impact on country development. For example,
the startup cost is one of the components of business environment indica-
tors constructed by the World Bank and by the World Economic Forum. I
this paper, I show that such entry cost differences alone may lead to ma-
jor differences in income levels. The higher entry barriers affect bargaining
over output: highly skilled people get a lower reward for training their low-
skilled partners. Also, individuals of different skills match to each other less
optimally, which results in a lower distribution of human capital. When
emigration is allowed, some people with high skill emigrate from countries
with poor institutions, which further lowers the human capital distribution
at home; nobody wants to return.
When the home country improves its institutions, it drastically changes
migration patterns: people with average human capital emigrate to ac-
quire knowledge abroad, and return once their human capital becomes high
enough. As a result, the home country grows three times faster than it would
grow without return migration, despite the fact that the number of returnees
per year is only about 0.1% of home country population.
In my model, return migration is a perfectly rational choice even without
“homesickness”or exogenous productivity differences. When enough human
capital is acquired, it may become optimal to return, because high skill is
endogenously rewarded better in countries with scarce skill but good insti-
tutions.
2 The model of closed economy
2.1 Individuals
This is a one-sector dynamic model set up in discrete time. The economy is
populated by a continuum of individuals of a finite mass. Each individual i
at each point in time t is endowed with human capital hi,t ∈ [0,∞) which
evolves endogenously.
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For each individual, there exists a small probability δ of death at each
moment of time; for simplicity, death rate does not depend on individual’s
age. The same number of new people is born; their (initial) human capital
is zero. As a result, the country population remains constant.
All individuals have identical risk-neutral preferences over the only con-
sumption good:
Ui =
∞∑
t=t0,i
βt−t0,ici,t
where β is the discount factor, ci,t is consumption, and t0,i is the birth date
of individual i. The date of death is uncertain; the probability of death is
built into the discount factor β.
Due to complete credit markets, people can borrow and save. Assuming
the interest rate equals the discount rate, people are indifferent between
having more consumption today and more consumption tomorrow due to
their linear preferences; they simply maximize their discounted stream of
earnings. As a result, there is no need to model savings explicitly.
2.2 Production and learning
The production of the good occurs in partnerships; each partnership consists
of two individuals. The only inputs in production are the human capitals of
the two partners. When individuals i and j work together, they produce
y(hi, hj) = min{hi, hj} (1)
Note there exists a complementarity between human capitals of the two part-
ners.4
The evolution of an individual’s human capital depends on her partner’s
human capital. Suppose an apprentice with human capital h1 works with
a master with human capital h2 (which implies h1 ≤ h2). Then, the next
period human capitals are
h′1 = h1 + g(h2 − h1) + λ0
h′2 = h2 + λ0
(2)
The master’s knowledge increases at a small rate λ0 which reflects “learning
from experience”. Apprentice’s knowledge increment is much higher and
4Generally, any production function with complementary inputs can be used – for
example, O-ring production function used by Kremer (1991).
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depends on master’s knowledge. If an individual does not have a partner, he
also increases his human capital at rate λ0.
I assume the following properties of the learning function g(·):
• g(0) = 0 — no learning from an equal partner
• g′(0) = λ with λ ∈ (0, 1) — if the master is just slightly smarter than
the apprentice, the latter reduces the knowledge gap by fraction λ each
period
• g′′(x) < 0 for all x ≥ 0 — marginal returns from a smarter master are
diminishing
Throughout the paper, I use the following learning function:
g(x) = log(1 + λx) (3)
It satisfies all the properties mentioned above.
Note that in the absence of learning from a partner (λ ≡ 0) the Pareto-
optimal allocation is to match individuals of as close as possible skill because
of the production complementarity.
2.3 Matching
At the beginning of each period, most individuals are matched to a partner,
but some are unmatched. A randomly chosen fraction θ of the unmatched
individuals are randomly matched to each other; the remaining fraction 1−
θ stays unemployed this period. The parameter θ serves as a proxy for
institutional quality in a country. With higher θ, the unmatched individuals
have more frequent opportunities to form a new partnership.
Individuals coupled to each other (both previously matched and newly
matched) can decide whether to work together or split and remain unem-
ployed this period. Those who work need to decide how they divide their
joint revenue — this decision is made according to Nash bargaining rule (see
below). The apprentice’s share may be even negative in equilibrium, which
implies some sort of tuition for education.
If the two partners decide to stay together, most likely they will be
matched to each other again. For most couples, this is beneficial: it en-
ables them to form long-term relationships, the apprentice can acquire most
of master’s knowledge. Some couples, however, are worse off from being
6
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Figure 1: Timing in closed economy. Arrow thickness indicates fraction of
population following this path in a typical steady state
matched to each other again: they would prefer to be matched to new ran-
domly chosen partners. By assumption, changing a partner requires at least
one period of unemployment; as a result, partnerships last longer than they
would in the absence of search frictions. With poor country institutions (low
θ), establishing a new partnership takes more time, which makes people re-
luctant to shut down existing partnerships, and therefore making them less
efficient.
Although working partners are usually matched to each other again and
again, there exists a small probability that they are forced to join the pool
of unmatched people. This happens than one of the partners dies; I also
assume that a small fraction of couples are forced to split exogenously, even
when both partners survive.5
5The reason for introducing the exogenous split is technical: when some individuals are
forced to enter the job market, the distribution of skill on the job market becomes more
stable, which greatly improves the numerical algorithm
7
2.4 Bargaining
A couple of partners divides their joint output according to Nash bargaining
rule. Each potential partner i calculates his reservation wage wt(hi, hj),
which makes him indifferent between staying with current partner j, and
remaining unemployed this period and meeting a new partner tomorrow:
wt(hi, hj) + β[(1− γ)V mt+1(h′i, h′j) + γV ut+1(h′i)] ≡ βV ut+1(hi + λ0)
where V mt (hi, hj) is the value of i being matched with j at time t, V
u
t is the
value of being unmatched, γ is the probability of exogenous split, h′i and h
′
j
are future human capitals of i and j if they work together.
Then, the surplus created by the match is the difference between the joint
output of i and j, and the sum of their reservation wages:
y(hi, hj)− (wt(hi, hj) + wt(hj, hi))
If the surplus is non-negative, i and j stay together; otherwise they split.
Since the possibility frontier is linear, Nash bargaining implies that each
partner earns his reservation wage plus half of the surplus, hence i’s wage
when working with j is
wt(hi, hj) = wt(hi, hj) +
1
2
(y(hi, hj)− (wt(hi, hj) + wt(hj, hi)))
Since the individuals divide the surplus equally, their accept-reject deci-
sions (whether to stay together or split) are always synchronized: either both
partners choose to be together, or both of them choose to split.
2.5 Equilibrium and steady state
The equilibrium in this model consists of the following:
• Distributions of individuals across types, at every moment of time:
f1, f2, ..., ft, ... with
ft = {fmt (hi, hj), fut (hi)}
where fmt describes the density of individuals of type i matched with
those of type j, and fut describes the density of unmatched individuals
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• Path of wages, or bargaining outcomes, for every potential couple of
partners: w1, w2, ..., wt, ...
• Values associated with each state, at every moment of time: V1, V2, ..., Vt, ...
where
Vt = {V mt (hi, hj), V ut (hi)}
These values are defined as follows. Define V int (hi, hj) as the value of i
working with j, and V outt (hi) as the value of being unemployed:
V int (hi, hj) = wt(hi, hj) + β[(1− γ)V mt+1(h′i, h′j) + γV ut+1(h′i)]
V outt (hi) = βV
u
t+1(hi + λ0)
Then, the values of being matched and unmatched are
V mt (hi, hj) = max{V int (hi, hj), V outt (hi)} (4)
V ut (hi) = θ
∫
V mt (hi, hj)f
u(hj)dhj∫
fu(hj)dhj
+ (1− θ)V outt (hi) (5)
In a steady state, all objects mentioned above are time-invariant. The rest
of this paper, except the last section, deals with computing and analyzing
steady states.
2.6 Results
As many models with heterogenous agents, this model is too complex for
analytical analysis. I solve the model numerically, using parameter values
described below. I consider two scenarios: the “North” (a closed economy
with good institutions) and the “South” (an economy with poor institutions).
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Variable Notation Value Comment
Model period, fre-
quency of match-
ing
2 months
Discount factor β 0.99 people discount future at
about 6% per year
Death rate δ 0.0025 life expectancy is about 67
years
Probability of ex-
ogenous split
γ 0.01
Speed of learning
by experience
λ0 0.0025 without learning from others,
human capital increases by 1
during average lifetime
Speed of learning
from others
λ 0.02 knowledge gap between mas-
ter and apprentice is reduced
by at most 12% per year
Probability of be-
ing matched with
new partner
θ 1 (North);
1/6 (South)
Unmatched people in the
South wait on average for 1
year for a match, compared to
2 months in the North
The computational procedure of finding steady states is described in ap-
pendix A.
Due to higher entry barriers, it is harder to start a partnership in the
South. As a result, Southern individuals are less careful when choosing a
partner, and more reluctant to terminate inefficient partnerships, which re-
sults in a lower distribution of human capital in the long run. Figure 2 shows
the steady-state distribution of human capital in the North and in the South.
In both countries, the distribution peaks at zero — there is a mass point of
newly born individuals; then, the distribution peaks again near the highest
available human capital — because it is relatively easy to reach the frontier of
knowledge by learning from others, but very hard to go beyond that frontier.
I have no formal proof that the steady state is unique; however, in all my
experiments with different initial distributions, the system has converged to
the same steady state.
Individual wage w(hi, hj), obviously, increases with own human capital:
dw(hi, hj)
dhi
> 0
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Figure 2: Steady-state distribution of human capital
Figure 3: Distribution of human capital, conditional on age of individuals
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The dependence of wage on partner’s human capital hj is less trivial. It is
always true that the two equal partners (hj = hi) would divide their joint
output equally. Otherwise, the wage depends on model parameters, but some
common patterns can be traced. I consider two distinct cases: less skilled
partner (hj < hi) and more skilled partner (hj > hi).
When j is more skilled, today’s output y(hi, hj) = min{hi, hj} does not
depend on hj, so the amount of wealth to be divided does not change as hj
increases. A higher hj, however, implies that i would learn faster and be able
to earn more tomorrow, therefore i agrees to accept lower wages today. This
results in a negatively sloped wage function:
dw(hi, hj)
dhj
< 0 when hj > hi
This property, combined with the fact that w(0, 0) = 0, implies that an indi-
vidual with zero human capital earns a negative income as long as partner’s
skill is positive.6
When j is less skilled than i, there are two effects of increased hj. First,
since now the output is determined by j’s skill, the amount of wealth to
be divided increases as hj increases; both partners, i and j, benefit from
it. Second, increased hj means a smaller knowledge gap between i and j,
and therefore less learning occurs, which lowers the reward of the master i.
The first effect, increasing i’s wage, dominates when hj is small; the second
effect, decreasing i’s wage, dominates when hj gets close to hi. As a result,
for every master with human capital hi there exists an “optimal” apprentice
who provides the highest income for i.
The effect of poor institutions (lower θ) is worse outside opportunities of
both bargaining parties. Since the low-skilled individuals have low outside
opportunities anyway, they have a relatively stronger bargaining position,
and get a higher fraction of output. As a result, learning from a higher part-
ner is cheaper in the South, where institutions are poor; conversely, teaching
lower-skilled individuals is rewarded better in the North. This discrepancy
creates a basis for South-North high-skilled emigration, when migration be-
6I have considered a version of the model with borrowing constraints, when young
individuals can only learn if they have enough initial wealth. In this setting individuals
are characterized by two state variables: knowledge and wealth, thus the matches of
individuals are defined in four-dimensional state space. This model was abandoned due
to excessive numerical complexity
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Figure 4: Wage in the North, as a function of partner’s human capital
comes available. Figure 5 compares wages in the North and in the South for
an individual of a given skill.
Figure 6 shows optimal accept-reject decisions in the steady state, in the
North. Individuals do not work together if their human capitals are equally
low – because no learning occurs when the partners have equal human capital.
Individuals with low human capitals also do not match with those who have
very high human capital – because the learning function is concave, it is
better to match low-h apprentices with average-h masters. In the South, the
opportunity cost of a match is much higher; this means a wider white area
on a similar Southern graph.
In the South, the autarky GDP per capita is about 54% of the Northern
value.
3 One-way migration and brain drain
When modeling migration between North and South, a number of additional
assumptions are made.
• The North is a large country: migration has no effect on its steady
state
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Figure 5: Wage of an individual with hi = 91 (Southern 99
th percentile), as
a function of partner’s human capital
Figure 6: Accept-reject decisions of Northern randomly matched partners:
stay together in white area, split in black area
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• The Northerners always live in their home country; only Southerners
migrate. With this assumption, the South is not flooded with North-
erners once the value of living in the South gets high
• Migration is available at the end of each period, and only for unmatched
individuals
• Migration is instantaneous; the migrants join the unmatched pool at
the new location
• The number of people born each period in the South is constant; it
does not depend on migration patterns. This assumption allows me to
define a steady state with migration
• The North restricts immigration: the number of Southerners living
in the North cannot exceed 5% of Southern population at any time.
The Northern government imposes an emigration fee, which makes this
restriction incentive compatible
This last assumption is needed to prevent too much South-North migra-
tion. In practice, developed countries do restrict immigration, and only a
small fraction of the developing world population is able to emigrate.7
Assuming that South retains its poor institutions, I show below that
migration occurs only in one direction: South to North; emigrants never
return. This makes Southerners living in the North identical to Northerners
themselves; their value of living in the North is identical to that of Northern-
born population. This allows us to introduce migration into the model in a
cheap way: emigration simply becomes an outside opportunity; to find the
steady state, there is no need to track the history of emigrants.
In the new steady state, all Southerners benefit from emigration. Due to
Northern immigration restrictions, only a few of them, those with the highest
incentives, emigrate. Surprisingly, the emigrants have high, but not the
highest skill; figure 7 shows that emigration incentive peaks around h = 51
(90th percentile of Southern human capital), and declines between 51 and
70 (Southern highest human capital). As a result, individuals with human
capital around 51 offer the highest emigration fee, and only they actually
7According to the study of Docquier and Marfouk (2004), the number of immigrants
in the OECD countries does not exceed 60 million people (this number includes migrants
from one OECD country to another), which is only about 1% of the world population
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Figure 7: Southern human capital distribution (upper graph) and benefits of
emigration (lower graph), in the steady state with one-way migration
emigrate. Their emigration causes a depression of human capital distribution
at 51; in the long run, because the emigrants do not pass their knowledge onto
young Southerners, the human capital distribution deteriorates compared to
the autarky scenario. Figure 7 also confirms that no emigrant wants to
return: everyone’s emigration benefit is far above zero.
Why is emigration benefit non-monotonic? There are several factors that
affect migration incentives. One factor is the difference in bargaining solu-
tions, w(hi, hj), between North and South. In the South, everyone has bad
outside opportunities, which makes bargaining less dependent on human cap-
itals. High-skilled Southerners generally earn a lower reward for their skill,
which makes them more willing to migrate — emigration benefit is generally
upward sloping. On the other hand, it pays off to be the “king of the hill”
in a country — having slightly more human capital than anybody else in the
economy slightly increases the reward because such an individual is basically
a monopolist possessing a scarce resource. Consequently, Southerners with a
very high (by Southern standards) skill are slightly less willing to emigrate
and make a slightly lower bid to purchase the right to do so.
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Figure 8: Wage of an individual with hi = 63 (new Southern 99
th percentile),
as a function of partner’s human capital, in the steady state with one-way
migration
Figure 8 compares wages at home and abroad, for the most talented
Southerners (h = 63). Teaching individuals of very low skill is still more
beneficial in the North; however, the reward for teaching those only slightly
below the top (hi ∈ (50, 63)) is nearly identical and, in fact, slightly higher
in the South. This effect keeps the most smart Southerners at home.
A natural question arises: if individuals of modest skill emigrate, and no
one lives forever, then who are the people at the top of human capital distri-
bution and where did they come from? The explanation comes from the fact
that people face idiosyncratic shocks: if an individual from the “emigration
range” of skills was suddenly left without a partner, he emigrates; if such
an individual was learning from a top-skilled master, the former does not
emigrate and jumps over the emigration range. Once individual’s skill rises
above the emigration range of skills, he stays in the South for good.
What happens to Southern emigrants abroad? Because they work with
more educated Northerners, the emigrants learn a lot while they live in the
North; their skills grow far beyond the Southern knowledge frontier. Their
return would have a great effect on the Southern human capital distribution;
however, they have no interest in returning.
Due to emigration of the highly skilled, the GDP per capita among South-
erners decreases down to 63% of the Southern autarky level. Obviously, the
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joint income of Southerners at home and Southerners abroad is higher, but
still only 70% of its autarky level. Thus, we may conclude that the brain
drain hurts the Southern economy. This result confronts Mountford’s (1997)
idea that emigration possibility increases learning incentives and thus may
be beneficial for home country.
I have tested the one-way migration steady state with different values
of θ (institutional quality). As long as the Southern institutions are worse
than that of the North, one-way emigration is incentive-compatible in the
steady state: nobody wants to return.8 With improved institutions, the
“king of the hill” effect gets stronger: the bargaining position of the highly-
skilled individuals improves, and they get a better reward for training those
below them. Conversely, with worse institutions the “king of the hill” effect
weakens until it totally disappears: when institutions are bad enough, the
very best people emigrate. I have computed the selection rate defined as
the ratio of the emigrant’s average skill to average skill of all Southerners.9
In experiments, it is inversely related to the quality of institutions: as the
institutional quality improves from θ = 1/12 to 1/6 (benchmark) to 1/3, the
selection rate decreases from 1.623 to 1.439 to 1.112.
This negative relationship is supported by the data. Docquier and Mar-
fouk (2004) provide data on the stock of migrants from most world countries
to the OECD countries, disaggregated by three levels of skill (low, medium,
high). Based on this data, I calculate the selection rate, by country of mi-
grants’ origin, as the fraction of the highly-skilled among emigrants, divided
by the fraction of the highly-skilled among all workforce at home. As a
proxy for institutional quality, I use the “government effectiveness” from
the cross-country dataset constructed by Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi
(2006). They define the government effectiveness as
the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and
the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality
of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of
the governments commitment to such policies
I regress the selection rate on the government effectiveness and a couple
of control variables; the results are shown in the table below.
8Return migration only may exist during the transition from one steady state to another
9Emigrant’s skill is measured at the moment of migration
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Dependent variable: selection rate
Explanatory variables Value Std.err. t-stat.
Constant 6.1685 0.9115 6.7677
Govt. effectiveness -3.5315 0.7823 -4.5145
Workforce at home (mln) 0.0132 0.0117 1.1306
Landlocked country dummy 6.3973 1.9167 3.3377
The effect of the government quality on the selection rate is negative and
significant, which supports the predictions of the model.
4 Improved institutions and return migration
4.1 The story
What happens if the South improves its institutions to the Northern level? In
the rest of the paper, I study the effects of unexpected institutional improve-
ment on the Southern economy. To isolate the effect of return migration, I
compare two scenarios: return migration is allowed and free; return migra-
tion is prohibited. In both scenarios, I assume that the Northern government
preserves its 5% quota on immigrants at any moment of time.
The long-run effect of the institutional improvement is trivial: under both
scenarios, the Southern economy converges to the Northern steady state.10
The interesting question here is the speed of adjustment, which appears to
be drastically different. Approximating the speed of adjustment, however,
requires to calculate the equilibrium transition path. Appendix B describes
the computational strategy.
4.2 Results
No return migration
The institutional improvement has instantaneous effect on bargaining. Now,
changing partners becomes easy; high-skilled individuals ask a higher reward
for teaching. The benefit of emigration drastically decreases; for people with
very high human capital it becomes negative, which means that highly-skilled
emigrants would return if they could (figure 9 demonstrates new migration
incentives). The emigration pattern changes; the emigrants have lower skill
10At least, no “poverty traps” have been discovered
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Figure 9: Benefits of emigration from the South, depending on human capital,
immediately after the reform. Negative benefit implies willingness to return.
Lower figure shows Southern human capital distributions at the moment of
reform
than before: about 37 (the Southern median skill), compared to 51 (about
90th percentile) before the reform. The new emigration pattern doesn’t hurt
the Southern economy as much. The 5% emigration quota is still fully used;
the flow of emigrants each period does not change.
Return migration possible
With poor Southern institutions, emigrants left for good; while living in the
North, they acquired a lot of human capital. Figure 9 shows that highly-
skilled emigrants are better off from returning home, when institutions im-
prove. Intuitively, high skill is scarce in the South; with efficient institutions,
highly (by Northern standards) skilled emigrants can earn more by return-
ing and training highly (by Southern standards) skilled locals. Figure 10
compares wages of a smart individual at home and abroad, depending on
partner’s skill.
As a result, in the first year following the reform, about 10% of emigrants,
20
Figure 10: Wage of an individual with hi = 157 (Northern 99th percentile),
depending on partner’s skill, immediately after the reform
the most skilled ones, return, greatly expanding the frontier of available
human capital. In subsequent periods, the following migration pattern arises:
some individuals with medium (around 40) human capital emigrate; once
they acquire a sufficient amount of knowledge in the North, they return.
The average human capital of return migrants is about 120, far above locals’
human capital. Overall, about 55% of all emigrants return. Due to high
return migration, the North admits more immigrants every period of time
which causes higher migration flows.
Still, the flow of return migrants is very small: on average year, the num-
ber of return migrants is about 0.1% of total Southern population. Neverthe-
less, the effect of return migration is tremendous: the returnees bring home
knowledge that was previously unavailable; this knowledge is disseminated
onto other Southerners. Figure 11 compares the average Southern human
capital growth with and without return migration. With return migration,
the growth is approximately three times faster. Figure 11 also demonstrates
the evolution of per capita GDP under the two scenarios. In the first five
years following the reform, both scenarios produce similar results. Immedi-
ately after the reform, GDP drops by about 40%: with better institutions,
many existing partnerships are terminated, and skills are reallocated in a
new, more efficient way. By the end of the second year, GDP is restored
to its original level and then continues its growth. After the fifth year, the
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Figure 11: Evolution of economy aggregates under the two scenarios
difference between the two scenarios becomes apparent; the economy grows
faster with return migration. Again, GDP growth is about three times faster
when return migration is available.
Figure 12 disaggregates the transition path: it shows human capital dis-
tributions under the two scenarios, twenty and one hundred years after the
reform. After twenty years, the difference between the two scenarios seems
small, but return migration brings a long thin tail of highly skilled individ-
uals. Their skill gradually disseminates onto locals through the matching
process, and by the year 100 the difference between the two scenarios be-
comes obvious. Without return migration, most people get close to Southern
knowledge frontier (around 70), but expansion of that frontier is a very slow
process; without knowledge spillovers from the North, it may take thousands
of years to catch up. With return migration, the highest available knowledge
in the South (around 150) is just slightly below that of the North; it will
probably take another hundred years to get close to Northern human capital
distribution.
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Figure 12: Distribution of human capital before and after the reform
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5 Conclusion
This paper constructs a model of “local” knowledge spillovers, in which less
skilled individuals learn from more skilled partners; the matching of partners
is random. The quality of country institutions, modeled as the degree of
matching frictions, greatly affects the accept-reject decisions in the matching
process and thus affects the long-run distribution of human capital available
on the job market.
When migration becomes available between countries with good (North)
and bad (South) institutions, highly-skilled Southerners emigrate for good,
leading to a permanent deterioration of the Southern human capital distri-
bution.
When the South improves its institutions to the Northern level, the most
highly-skilled emigrants return, because the payoff of being the “king of the
hill” in the South now outweighs the payoff of having smarter partners in
the North. The return migrants bring home previously unavailable knowl-
edge; local population learns from the return migrants which leads to a rapid
human capital growth. Along the equilibrium transition path, the average
number of return migrants per year is only about 0.1% of local population;
despite their small number, they triple the economy growth after the insti-
tutional improvement, compared to no-return-migration scenario.
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A Computing steady states
As mentioned above, the concept of the steady state includes the following
time-invariant objects:
• Distribution of individuals across types f = {fm(hi, hj), fu(hi)}
• Wages w(hi, hj)
• Values V = {V m(hi, hj), V u(hi)}
To solve the model, I approximate the continuous distribution across types
by 201 discrete types of human capital, ranging from 0 to 200. Theoretically,
individual human capital does not have an upper bound because each period
individuals increment their knowledge by at least λ0, a finite positive value,
and because individual duration of life is not bounded from above. The
calculations, however, show that the probability of reaching beyond some
finite threshold of human capital becomes negligibly small, hence a finite
grid is a good approximation of human capital distribution.
The total number of individual states is then 2012 + 201 = 40602, which
renders impossible the precise computation of values and densities at each
state. I calculate the unknowns approximately using an iterative algorithm
described below. One problem I faced during the computation was discrete-
ness of decisions: individuals accept or reject matches by comparing the two
values; they randomize if the values are equal. Since the number of individual
types is finite and the mass of individuals of most types is strictly positive,
it is highly likely that in a steady state one of the types will be randomizing
between the two options. However, because I compute the values approxi-
mately using an iterative procedure, the values of accepting or rejecting the
matches will never be identical, and no individual will ever randomize. Be-
cause of this problem, the system may never fully converge to a steady state:
some types of matches will be “blinking”, staying together in one iteration
but splitting in the next. To override this problem, I force individuals to
randomize between the two options: when the values of accepting and re-
jecting are close, individuals choose the outcome randomly, with probability
of accepting sharply increasing as the difference in values increases. This
approach is illustrated on figure 13. This randomization was ignored when
calculating the values.
Another problem is that future states (human capitals after learning) lie
off the grid. I use the standard solution for this problem: when tomorrow
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Figure 13: Accept-reject decision randomization. Dashed line represents out-
comes in the theoretical model; solid line represents randomizing individuals
human capital falls off the grid, individuals are randomly assigned to one of
the nearest grid points. For example, future human capital of 5.2 implies
that human capital will be 5 with probability 80%, and 6 with probability
20%.
Below, I describe in detail the steps that I made to find steady states.
Step 0: Initialization
Define an initial distribution of individuals across states, values of each state,
and wages at each matched state.
Step 1: Update wages and values
The values are computed using the Bellman equation. First, I compute the
wages w(hi, hj) as described in section 2.4, using values V
m and V u taken
from the previous iteration. Then, I compute the values V m and V u using the
newly computed wage w and the distribution of potential partners fu. I run
multiple iterations to update wages and values, given the same distribution
fu, until the change in values becomes small enough.
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Step 2: Distribution update
Given wages and values, I simulate individual decisions and compute the
resulting distribution across states. The distribution update is performed a
fixed number of times11.
After that, I return to step 1; the whole procedure is repeated until the
change in distribution becomes small enough.
B Computing transition dynamics
Because convergence to the steady state takes an infinite number of periods,
and because each period in transition is different from the other, the precise
transition path cannot be computed; some kind of approximation is required.
I use the parametric path approach inspired by Judd (1999). This method
exploits the fact that the distribution of individuals across states evolves
smoothly over time, and therefore can be approximated by a smooth function
of time:
fut (h) =
(∑K
k=0 φk(h)akt
k∑K
k=0 akt
k
)
e−αt + fu∞(h)
(
1− e−αt) (6)
where fu∞ is the steady state distribution of potential partners, α is the speed
of convergence to the steady state, φk(h) are ex-ante chosen density functions
which resemble fut at different moments of time (notably, φ0(h) is the initial
distribution), and ak are the unknown parameters to be estimated. Judd
(1999) assumes that α is known ex-ante when solving the model, which is
not true in our case: the speed of convergence depends greatly on migration
patterns, which in turn depend greatly on individual expectations. Therefore,
I estimate the α along with other parameters.
B.1 Computing transition path, given beliefs about fu-
ture
Values and wages: backward induction
If emigrants are allowed to return, they are no longer identical to Northerners:
when bargaining, they have more outside opportunities than Northerners do.
11more than once – otherwise the algorithm would be too slow, because the distribution
is changing slowly
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Therefore, we need to calculate not only the values of living in the South,
but also the values of emigrants living in the North.
Using the bargaining rules described in section 2.4, the Bellman equation,
and individual beliefs about the evolution of potential Southern partners12,
I compute the path of values V0, V1, ..., Vt, ...
The backward induction procedure implies that we start from some final
date T and from some ex-ante chosen value VT . This terminal value is likely
to be incorrect, but the error should decrease as we move from one iteration
to another. My goal was to compute transition dynamics between years 0
and 100; to have accurate values between these dates, I started my backward
induction from the terminal year 150.
Distributions: forward induction
Given the path of values, I simulate individual accept-reject decisions in
bargaining, and migration decisions. To increase the accuracy of results, I
exploit the following property: with good institutions (θ = 1), the value of
being unmatched tomorrow is
V ut+1(hi) =
∫
V mt+1(hi, hj)f
u
t+1(hj)dhj∫
fut+1(hj)dhj
(7)
As mentioned above, it is impossible to calculate a perfectly accurate V m be-
cause it depends on entire stream of unknown future distributions; however,
it is possible to compute rational beliefs about fut+1 and therefore compute
more accurate V u using (7).
The transition is computed as follows. At the beginning of period t,
people have beliefs about V mt+1 and f
u
t+1; using (7), they compute the V
u
t+1.
Then, everybody makes decisions (bargaining, migration), which result in
new tomorrow distribution fut+1. Using this new distribution and the same
V mt+1, I compute the new V
u
t+1, and so on, until beliefs about f
u
t+1 become
perfectly rational. Then, I proceed to the next period.
B.2 Computing beliefs
To use Judd’s method described by (6), we need to specify the speed of
convergence α, distributions φk, and weight parameters ak. I do this in two
12The distribution of Northern partners does not change over time and is known precisely
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stages: first, I find α and suggest φk by computing a crude transition path;
then, I search for a for more accurate approximation.
Crude approximation
At this stage, I use the simplest version of (6) to model beliefs:
fut (h) = f
u
0 (h)e
−αt + fu∞(h)
(
1− e−αt)
I pick up a parameter α and use these beliefs to compute the values, and
then the transition path as described in section B.1. Given the transition
path, I estimate a new α, and so on, until the change in α becomes small
enough.
With this crude approximation, the actual distribution along the path
differs quite drastically from individual beliefs about that distribution. I
define φ1(h) as the “average” distribution over time
13
φ1(h) =
1
T
T∑
t=1
fut (h)
More accurate approximation
Since we add only one function φ1(h) to Judd’s formula (6), there is only
one unknown parameter a1.
14 I choose the a1 to minimize the discrepancy
between the actual transition path and individual beliefs about that tran-
sition. Given a1 and new beliefs, I compute the new transition path, then
estimate new a1, and so on, until the change in a1 becomes small enough.
Figure 14 demonstrates actual distributions of potential partners, and beliefs
about those distributions, at different points in time.
C If there were no matching frictions
Without matching frictions, when each individual can directly match with
the optimal partner, the model simplifies in a number of ways. First, be-
cause there is a large number of potential partners of each type, everyone’s
13We could also pick φ2 and φ3 and so on, but apparently only one extra degree of
freedom does a good job in approximation
14The a0 can be normalized to unity
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Figure 14: Distribution of potential partners in the South at different points
in time
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reservation wage exactly equals their actual income. Second, since another
partner can be found instantaneously, the state of an individual is described
only by his own human capital and does not depend on partner’s h:
V (hi) = max
hj
w(hi, hj) + βV (h
′
i)
where h′i is the future human capital described by (2). This problem can be
split into two subproblems: when i is the master (hi ≥ hj), and when i is
the apprentice (hi < hj). Since master’s future state does not depend on
apprentice’s knowledge, he simply maximizes current income. Therefore, we
can define master’s reservation wage as
wM(hi) = max
hj≤hi
w(hi, hj)
On the other hand, if i wants to learn from a higher partner j, he realizes that
j should earn his reservation wage and i will earn the residual; i’s problem is
max
hj>hi
y(hi, hj)− wM(hj) + βV (hi + g(hj − hi) + λ0) (8)
Since the production function is Leontief, current output does not depend
on master’s knowledge which simplifies the above optimization problem.15
Generally, this problem appears to have no analytical solution; but it can
be solved with the following
Assumption Individuals are always indifferent between being masters
and apprentices.
Then, the individual value function takes the form
V (hi) =
1
2
hi
1− β + C (9)
where C is a positive constant. With this value, it can be shown that when
i is the master, his reservation wage is wM(hi) =
1
2
hi + Cw, where Cw is
another positive constant.
The apprentice’s problem is to solve (8); the first-order condition is
−1
2
+
1
2
β
1− β
λ
1 + λ(h∗j − hi)
= 0
15That is exactly why the Leontief production function was chosen
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As a result, the optimal master-apprentice knowledge gap is
h∗j − hi =
β
1− β −
1
λ
It is positive as long as λ > 1−β
β
, and it does not depend on apprentice’s
current state. By calculating apprentice’s value, we can confirm that the
latter equals (9).
One big problem of frictionless matching is incentive compatibility: the
number of individuals with human capital h1 willing to learn from those with
human capital h2 must be exactly equal to those with h2 willing to teach
h1. Generally, it cannot be achieved under the assumption made above;
finding an equilibrium in such environment might become an arduous task.
With random matching, this problem dissolves, at the cost of adding more
dimensions to the state space.
32
References
[1] Acemoglu, D., S. Johnson, and J.A. Robinson (2001) The Colonial Ori-
gins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation. Ameri-
can Economic Review, vol. 91, no. 5, pages 1369-1401.
[2] Antras, P., L. Garicano, and E. Rossi-Hansberg (2006) Offshoring in a
Knowledge Economy. Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 121, no. 1,
pages 31-77.
[3] Beine, M. , F Docquier, H Rapoport (2001) Brain drain and economic
growth: theory and evidence. Journal of Development Economics, vol.
64, issue 1, page 275.
[4] Borjas, G., and B. Bratsberg (1996) Who leaves? The outmigration of
the foreign-born. The Review of Economics and Statistics, vol. 78, issue
1, pages 165–176.
[5] Commander, S., M. Kangasniemi, and L. Alan Winters (2003) The Brain
Drain: Curse or Boon? IZA discussion paper no. 809.
[6] Docquier, F., and A. Marfouk (2004). Measuring the international mo-
bility of skilled workers (1990-2000) - Release 1.0. World Bank Policy
Research Working Paper, n. 3382.
[7] Dustmann, C. (1996) Return migration: the European experience. Eco-
nomic Policy (April 1996).
[8] Dustmann, C. (2003) Return migration, wage differentials, and the op-
timal migration duration. European Economic Review, vol. 47, pages
353–369
[9] Dustmann, C. and O. Kirchkamp (2002) The optimal migration du-
ration and activity choice after re-migration. Journal of Development
Economics, vol. 67, pages 351-372.
[10] Gmelch, D. (1980) Return Migration. Annual Review of Anthropology,
vol. 9, pages 135-159.
[11] Gould, D.M. (1994) Immigrant links to the home country: empirical
implications for U.S. bilateral trade flows. The Review of Economics
and Statistics, vol. 76, issue 2, page 302.
33
[12] Haque, N.U., S.J. Kim (1995) ”Human Capital Flight”: Impact of Mi-
gration on Income and Growth. IMF Staff Papers, vol. 42, No.3, page
577.
[13] Huggett, M. (1993) The Risk-Free Rate in Heterogeneous-Agent
Incomplete-Insurance Economies. Journal of Economic Dynamics and
Control, vol. 17, pages 953-969.
[14] Jones, B. (2007) The Knowledge Trap: Human Capital and Develop-
ment Reconsidered (unpublished)
[15] Jovanovic, B. and R. Rob (1989) The Growth and Diffusion of Knowl-
edge. Review of Economic Studies, vol. 56, pages 569-582.
[16] Judd, K., F. Kubler, and K. Schmedders (2003) Computational Meth-
ods for Dynamic Equilibria with Heterogeneous Agents. In M. Dewa-
tripont, L.P. Hansen, and S. Turnovsky, eds., Advances in Economics
and Econometrics. Cambridge University Press.
[17] Kaufmann, D., A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi (2006) Governance matters
V: Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators for 19962005. World
Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4012.
[18] Kremer, M. (1991) The O-ring theory of economic development. The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 108, no. 3, pages 551-575.
[19] Ley, D., and A. Kobayashi (2005). Back to Hong Kong: return migration
or transnational sojourn? Global Networks, vol. 5 issue 2 (April 2005)
[20] Ljungqvist, L., and T. Sargent (2000) Recursive Macroeconomic Theory.
The MIT Press.
[21] Markusen, J. and N. Trofimenko (2007) Teaching Locals New Tricks:
Foreign Experts as a Channel of Knowledge Transfers. NBER working
paper no. 12872.
[22] Mountford, A. (1997) Can a brain drain be good for growth in the source
economy? Journal of Development Economics, vol. 53, no. 2, pages 287-
303.
[23] Nunn, N. (2004) Slavery, Institutional Development, and Long-run
Growth in Africa, 1400-2000 (unpublished).
34
[24] Olesen, H. (2002) Migration, Return, and Development: An Institu-
tional Perspective . International Migration, vol. 40, page 125
[25] Rauch, J.E. (1999) Networks versus Markets in International Trade.
Journal of International Economics, vol. 48, page 7.
[26] Rios-Rull, J.V. (1999) Computation of Equilibria in Heterogenous Agent
Models. In R. Marimon and A. Scott, Eds., Computational Methods for
the Study of Dynamic Economies. Oxford University Press.
[27] Santos, M.D.D., and F. Postel-Vinay (2003). Migration as a source of
growth: The perspective of a developing country. Journal of Population
Economics, vol. 16, pages 161-175.
[28] Saxenian, A. (2006) The New Argonauts: Regional Advantage in a
Global Economy. Harvard University Press.
[29] Stark, O. (1991) The Migration of Labor. Blackwell, Oxford.
[30] Stark, O. (1996). On the Microeconomics of Return Migration. In V.N.
Balasubramanyam and D. Greenaway, Eds., Trade and Development:
Essays in Honor of Jagdish Bhawati, pp.32–41. Basingtoke: Macmillan,
1996.
[31] Yang, D. (2006) Why Do Migrants Return to Poor Countries? Evidence
from Philippine Migrants Responses to Exchange Rate Shocks. Review
of Economics and Statistics, vol. 88, no. 4, pages 715-735.
[32] Zhao, Y. (2002) Causes and Consequences of Return Migration: Recent
Evidence from China. Journal of Comparative Economics, vol. 30, pages
376–394
35
